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AB STRACT
This paper examines the response of the term structure of interest
rates to weekly money announcements. Estimated responses for both the
pre— and post—October 1979 periods are first presented. Then, two com-
peting hypotheses involving the policy anticipations and expected infla-
tion effects are formally specified and compared to the estimated responses.
Both hypotheses are found to be consistent with the responses, but they
have sharply different implications about the Federal Reserve's short—
run monetary policy. The expected inflation hypothesis implies that
weekly money surprises should have persistent effects on the level of the
money stock, reflecting shifts in the Federal Reserve's long—run target.
In contrast, the policy anticipations hypothesis implies that the effect
of money surprises should diminish over time, reflecting the Federal
Reserve's desire to offset deviations from target. Additional empirical
results reported in the paper support this latter description of the
money stock process.
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MONETARY POLICY REGIMES, EXPECTED INFLATION,
AND THE RESPONSE OF INTEREST RATES
TO MONEY ANNOUNCEMENTS
V. Vance Roley and Carl E. Walsh*
Recent studies on the response of interest rates to weekly money
announcements reveal several interesting empirical relationships. First, the
empirical results of Berkman (1978), Grossman (1981), and Urich and Wachtel
(1981) indicate that Treasury bill yields rise (fall) in response to an unanti-
cipated increase (decrease) in the announced money stock.- Second, Roley
(1982, 1983) and Cornell (1983) find that the magnitude of the bill—yield
response increased following the Federal Reserve's announced change in operating
procedures on October 6, 1979. Third, Cornell (1983) estimates significant
positive responses for long—term yields in both the pre— and post—October 1979
periods, with a significantly larger response in the post—October 1979 period.
These empirical results are of interest not only because of the
magnitude of the interest—rate fluctuations associated with unanticipated
announced changes in money, but also because the estimated responses potentially
provide evidence on the short—run monetary policy rule describing Federal
Reserve behavior. In particular, under rational expectations, the market's
response depends importantly on the Federal Reserve's desire to offset deviations
in money from its target. The empirical evidence, however, appears to be consis-
tent with two different hypotheses about the Federal Reserve's desire to control
money as well as the information content of weekly money announcements.
One hypothesis relies on studies by Fama (1975) and Nelson and Schwert
(1977), among others, who estimate that changes in expected inflation account
for most of the fluctuations in nominal interest rates.-1 Under this hypothesis,— 2—
a positive surprise in a weekly money announcement that is not expected tobe
offset totally by the Federal Reserve leads to an increase in expected infla-
tion. Thus, the increased interest—rate response following the change in
operating procedures in October 1979 is interpreted as evidence thatthe
Federal Reserve is less committed to monetary control. Moreover, the signi—
ficant response of long—term interest rates in both the pre— and post—October
1979 periods is interpreted as reflecting changes only in expected inflation
[e.g., Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982)].
The other hypothesis is based on a policy anticipations effect. Under
this hypothesis, market participants are assumed not to revise their expectation
about future inflation on the basis of any one—week's money surprise. Instead,
the Federal Reserve is assumed to offset at least partially any deviation in
money from its target. A positive money surprisewould then imply a rise in
expected future interest rates in anticipation of policy actions designed to
bring the money stock back to target. This paradigm, therefore, suggeststhat
real interest rates change in response to unanticipated announced changes in
money. Thus, in contrast to the expected inflation hypothesis,the increased
interest—rate response after October 1979 is consistent with a greater desire
by the Federal Reserve to control money along with other possibleeffects
related more closely to the change in operating procedures itself [e.g., Roley
(1982, 1983) and Walsh (1983)]. Evidence supporting the policy anticipations
hypothesis is presented by Cornell (1982) and Engel andFrankel (1982) who find,
in the context of the foreign exchange market, that the dollar appreciatesin
response to a positive surprise in announcedmoney.' However, both Cornell—3—
(1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) claim that the response of long—term interest
rates Is too large to be explained by this effect.
The purpose of this paper is to specify separate models consistent with
the policy anticipations and expected inflation effects, respectively, and to
compare their implications for interest rate responses over the entire term
structure. The increased response of interest rates after October 1979 and
the relatively large response of long—term rates are shown to be consistent
with the policy anticipations effect. In particular, these phenomena can be
explained by the Federal Reserve's change in operating procedures, the degree
of short—run monetary control, and the persistence of money demand shocks.
Other models of the policy anticipations effect do not include long—term
interest rates, and they selectively ignore such important institutional
features as the type of operating procedures used by the Federal Reserve, lagged
reserve accounting, and the lag in money announcements [e.g., Urich (1982)
and Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983)]. This institutional detail plays a key
role in the models considered here.
In the first section of this paper, the response of the term structure
of interest rates in the pre— and post—October 1979 periods is estimated.
The policy anticipations and the expected inflation models are presented in
the second and third sections, respectively. In the fourth section, the empirical
results are reconciled with the predictions of both models, and additional
empirical evidence on the relative merits of the two models is discussed. The
main conclusions are summarized in the final section.
I. Estimated Response of Interest Rates
In this section, the response of the term structure of interest rates
in the pre— and post—October 1979 periods is estimated. The empirical results—4—
exhibit both the increase responsiveness since October 1979 and the relatively
large response of long—term yields. These results are presented following
brief discussions of the specification and data used in the estimation.
Specification
The usual efficient markets approach is adopted to estimate the
response of interest rates to weekly money announcements.To conform with
the theoretical models presented in subsequent sections, the consequences





where Rt =changein the interest rate over a time interval including the
money stock announcement in week t
=announcedlevel of the money stock in week t
=market'srational expectation of the announced level of the
money stock in week t
=randomerror term uncorrelated with any information available
to the public prior to the money announcement in week t
b0,b1 =estimatedcoefficients
While a constant term is always included in the empirical specifications,
it should equal zero under the null hypothesis of market efficiencyand in
the absence of systematic measurement error.
Data
All of the data described below are weekly and span the period beginning
on September 29, 1977 and ending on October 15, 1982.The last observation of
the pre—October 1979 subsample falls on October 5, 1979. Observations were
excluded if either discount rate changes or announcements of otherrelevant
economic data were made within the time interval corresponding to themeasured
change in interestrates.'-.5—
The money stock data consist of announced weekly levels of the narrowly
defined money stock, in billions of dollars, as reported in the Federal Reserve's
H.6 release. From the beginning of the sample through January 31, 1980, the
data correspond to "old Mi," and weekly announcements were made on Thursday.
From February 8, 1980, through October 15, 1982, announcements were made on
Friday. For this period, the data employed are those for Mi—B, and more
recently, Ml, where the definition of this latter aggregate is equivalent to
that of Ml—B.-"
Data for the expected announced level of the money stock are based on
the survey data compiled by Money Market Services, Inc. The survey data
represent the market's expected announced change in the money stock. To
construct expected levels, market participants are assumed to expect no revi-
sion in the previous week's announced level.-" The survey data begins on
September 29, 1977. Prior to February 8, 1980, the median of the Thursday
survey is used to represent the market's anticipated money announcement on
each Thursday. For the remainder of the sample, the survey was conducted
on Tuesday for the Friday announcement. Because of this misalignment, a
revised expectation reflecting the availability of new information from
Tuesday to Friday is used.Zi
The yield data are taken from the H.15 release, published by the
Federal Reserve. All data are in terms of coupon—equivalent yields, in
percent, and quoted bids are used. The change in interest rates is measured
from 3:30 p.m. on the day of a money announcement to 3:30 p.m. on the following
business day. Thus, any effect of money announcements—which are made at
8/ 4:10 p.m.—should be reflected in the measured change in yields.——6—
Empirical Results
Estimation results of the efficient markets model (1) over the pre—
9/
and post—October 1979 subsainples are presented in Table 1.—Within each
subsample, the estimated response of Treasury security yieldsdeclines, with
one exception, as maturity increases. In the pre—October1979 subsample, for
example, the 3—month Treasury bill yield is estimated toincrease by about
6 1/2 basis points for a 1 percent announced money surprise,while the 20—year yield
increases by about 1 basis point. Similarly, in the post—October1979 subsample,
the 3—month yield's response is over 2 1/2 times greaterthan that of the
20—year yield. Despite the lower estimated responseof long—term yields,
Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) suggest that the responseis nevertheless
too large to be explained by the policy anticipationseffect, especially in the
post—October 1979 period. Instead, the expectedinflation effect is hypothesized
to account for the response of long—term yields.
The empirical results in Table 1 also Indicate that theestimated response
for all maturities of Treasury securities is over fivetimes larger In the post—
October 1979 period. In the last column, the equalityof the response is
formally tested, and In each case the null hypothesis canbe rejected at less
than the 1 percent level ofsignificance) As mentioned earlier, these
results are apparently consistent with two competing hypotheses.First, the
response may have increased becauseof the change in Federal Reserve operating
procedures and perhaps a somewhat greatercommitment to monetary control
[Roley (1982, 1983) and Walsh (1983)]. Second,the larger response may reflect
less desire to control money, implying larger changesin expected inflation for
a given money surprise (Cornell (1983)and Hardouvelis (1982)]. These empirical
results are discussed further in the fourth sectionin the context of the two
competing hypotheses.Table 1









b0' b1 R2 SE F(l,194)
*
RFF .0036 .4216 —.02 .1009 .0516 43.31 .11 .6605 15.86
(.0128) (2.890) (.0570) (10.37)
* * *
R1W .0501 4.686 —.00 .1752 .2146 36.72 .10 .5891 9.26
(.0222) (5.O17) (.0509) (9.253)
* *
R3M .0121 6.478 .05 .1070 .0567 36.40 .21 .3847 19.48
(.0136) (3.065) (.0332) (6.046)
* *
R1Y .0087 5.199 .11 .0625 .0279 35.54 .29 .3005 36.14
(.0079) (1.789) (.0259) (4.719)
* * *
R5Y .0031 2.574 .10 .0326 .0397 21.23 .24 .2074 30.34
(.0041) (.9322) (.0179) (3.257)
* *
R1OY .0067 .9197 —.00 .0332 .0381 16.08 .19 .1804 25.74
(.0042) (.9495) (.0156) (2.834)
* *
R2OY .0036 1.161 .03 .0238 .0367 14.41 .16 .1812 20.50
(.0030) (.6809) (.0157) (2.847)
*significant at 5 percent level.
+The pre-October 1979subsample begins on September 29, 1977 and ends on October 5, 1979.
The post—October 1979 subsample begins on October 8, 1979 and ends on October 15, 1982.
Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses.
Treasury security yield data correspond to changes in bid quotations from 3:30 p.m. on the
announcement day to 3:30 p.m. on the following business day. Federal funds rate data
are daily averaged yields. (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
H.15.)
61n eachtest, the null hypothesis can be rejected at less than the 1 percent level of
significance.
RFF =federalfunds rate
RIW =1—weekTreasury bill yield
R3M =3—monthTreasury bill yield
RIY =1—yearconstant maturity yield on Treasury securities
R5Y =5—yearconstant maturity yield on Treasury securities
R1OY =10—yearconstant maturity yield on Treasury securities
R2OY =20—yearconstant maturity yield on Treasury securities
UN =lnN—1ewhere M and Me are the actual and expected announced levels of
the money stock, in billions of dollars (Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, H.6; and Money Market Services, Inc.)
e =randomerror term
t
= multiplecorrelation coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom
SE =standarderror—7—
II. Policy Anticipations Model
In this section, a model of the response of interest rates to money
announcements is developed which focuses exclusively on the policy ariticipa—
tions effect. By ignoring the role of expected inflation, it will be
possible to determine whether the policy anticipations explanation is, in
isolation, consistent with the empirical results reported in Table 1. Of
particular interest is the ability of the model to explain the response of
long—term interest rates as well as the increased response of all rates in
the post—October 1979 period. Because institutional features are important
for a complete understanding of the policy anticipations effect, it will
be useful to begin with an overview of the Federal Reserve's policy proce-
dures before turning to the formal model.
The money stock figure released at 4:10 p.m. on Fridays is the Federal
Reserve's current estimate of the money stock during the settlement week
ending nine days previously. This has two important implications. First,
because of lagged reserve accounting, the Friday announcement provides
market participants with an estimate of the deposit levels against which
required reserves for the current settlement week are levied. Second, because
money demand shifts cause week to week movements in the quantity of money, the
announcement provides information on any money demand shift which may have
occurred two weeks previously.--"
In estimating the money stock prior to the Friday announcement, the
Federal Reserve may adjust its target path for the monetary aggregates in
light of any deviation of actual money from target. Under lagged reserve
accounting, monetary policy is implemented by using a policy instrument——8—
thefederalfunds rate in the pre—October 1979 period and nonborrowed
reserves in the post—October 1979 period—in an attempt to make money
demand equal to the targeted quantity of money. While the direct effects
of Federal Reserve actions are to influence the federal funds rate, this
is not the interest rate most relevant for the demand for money. The
Federal Reserve must, therefore, estimate what change in the funds rate will
lead to changes in other short—term rates which, in turn, will produce the
desired effect on the demand for money. Any model of the policy anticipations
effect needs, therefore, to specify: 1) the informational content of the
money announcement and how it depends on the operating procedures of the
Federal Reserve; 2)the determinants of the demand for money; 3) the linkages
between variables influencing money demand and the Federal Reserve's policy
instruments; 4) the operating procedures followed by the Federal Reserve in
attempting to achieve its monetary targets; and 5)the manner in which the
target path for money is adjusted in light of deviations between the actual
quantity of money and the target path.
Within this conceptual framework, consider the actions of the Federal
Reserve at the beginning of settlement week t. Assume, for simplicity, that
in setting its policy instrument for week t, the Federal Reserve, but not
yet the public, knows m2, the (log) money supply during week t—2. This is
the number which will be announced on Friday of week t. The Federal Reserve
cannot yet observe but on the basis ofm2 (and perhaps other inforina—
tion), an estimate of week t—l s deviation from target, E(m1Ict) —
isformed, where denotes the Federal Reserve's information set at the start
of week t, E(m1Jc) is the expectation ofini conditional on and—9—
is the target value for mi which had been set at the start of
week t—l based on 2 .Theestimate of this deviation is used to revise the
t—1





According to (2), a deviation from target during week t—l leads to arevised
target path for money for all future weeks. Equation (2) impliesthat the
Federal Reserve plans to offset eventually a fraction (l_l) of the weekt—1
deviation from target. It does so only gradually, however, at the rate (1—A)
per week. The remaining fraction of the deviation, ,isnot offset.1
If =0,the new path [m+(2)] returns to the old path [m+.(2i)] as j-.
Becausethis section treats expected inflation as constant in order to emphasize
the policy anticipations effect, equation (2) implicitly assumes thatthe
Federal Reserve does not revise its targeted long—run growth rate for the
money supply.
The Federal Reserve has two potential policy instruments: the weekly
average federal funds rate, i, or the weekly average pathof (log) nonborrowed
reserves, 1n1BR.-1 Dealing first with the pre—October 6,1979 period, i
will initially be treated as the tool used to implement policy.
Pre—October 1979 Qperat ing Procedures
Prior to October 1979, the Federal Reserve used in trying to equate
money demand to the targeted quantityof money. It is assumed that money demand
is given by—10—
where Pt is the log of the price level andrt is the rate on an n—week
security, such as a 13—week Treasury bill. The appearance of r in (3)
captures the notion that the demand for money does not depend on the federal
funds rate, but on a longer term interest rate. Income is treated as a
constant for this analysis and is not explicitly included in (3). Since, in
this section, Pt will be treated as a constant, it will be covenient to define
cx =+Pt and write
m =a—cr+u (3) t 0It t
As (3) is a weekly money demand equation, the random disturbance
14/ is likely to exhibit a high degree of serial correlation.— To model this
in a simple way, assume
Ut =pu1+ Ct, p1< 1 (4)
where is a white noise process.
An expectations model of the term structure of interest rates is used






Equation (5) reveals why current interest rates such as rt will depend on
anticipated future policy since rt is a function of expected future settings
of the policy variable
Using the money demand function (3), the Federal Reserve can calculate
the path of rt which is consistent with its target path for the money stock,
conditional on the information available at the beginning of week t. If
r÷.(c) is this target path, suppose i'+.O7) is the path for the federal funds
rate which satisfies:—11—
n-i
=(1/n)E ÷÷);I = 0,... (6)
J=O
Because of idiosyncratic developments during week t, assume the funds rate
actually set by the Federal Reserve is given by
=i()+
where is a mean zero, serially uncorrelated weekly policy deviation from
the targeted value of the funds rate.
With a funds rate operating procedure, the Federal Reserve sets
according to (7) at the beginning of the settlement week. Because i(c2) is
based on t which includes information not available to the public prior to
the Friday announcement, the public cannot distinguish the component parts








Equation (8) shows explicitly how r depends on the public's expectations about
the target path for the money supply.
In order to analyze the effects of the money announcement, it will be
necessary to define more specifically the public's information set and relate
it to the Federal Reserve's information set Let denote the public's
information prior to the money announcement. Let r be the equilibrium value
of rt, just prior to the announcement, obtained by substituting for in
(8). Similarly, define ={m2,) as the public's information set after—12—
is announced. The interest rate after the announcement is r. Since
the only new information analyzed here is the announcement oftn2, it follows
that =—1
=
From(3), m2 =— r2+ u2 so that prior to the announcement,
E(rn2I) =c
—cr2+pu3. The new information contained in the announce-





The money "surprise", the difference between the announcement on Friday and
the public's expectation ofin2, is just the week t—2 innovation in the money
demand disturbance.
Making use of the policy rule (2), together with (8), it is possible to
derive the adjustment inr which occurs in response to the announcement (details





t L 1—(l_A)nl ,n nj t—
Although the money surprise, 2' is itself direct informationonly on
the week t—2 money demand innovation, its effect onr can be seen from (10)
to consist of three components. The last term, c (l--n)1p/n <0is a Keynesian
liquidity effect. To the extent that a positive deviation above target, for
example, is partially accommodated <1),the money supply will be
permanently higher. Since the interest elasticity of the demand for money
is negative, interest rates must fall.
The middle term in (10) is positive and represents the effect onr of
the public's revised expectations about future money demand. Ifc2 >0,—13—
individuals revise upwards their estimates of future u's. Higher estimates
of future money demand lead to expectations of higher future interest rates
for a given target path.
The first term in (10), is negative since (l_X)hl <1.The upward
pressure on interest rates produced by a positive surprise is moderated to
the extent that the Federal Reserve is expected to return in to the target path
15/
onlygradually.—
Theeffect of the money announcement in this policy anticipations model
on interest rates of longer maturity than rt can also easily be derived using
the expectations model of the term structure. Let Rt be the rate on a security
with rnn weeks to maturity. Then
rn-i
R =(1/rn)Z E(r+k). (11)
k=0





The first and second terms on the RHS of (12) are both positive if >0.
The final term is negative, and it represents the money surprise that is
permanently accommodated and which, therefore, through a Keynesian liquidity
effect, tends to reduce future interest rates. If the Federal Reserve always
attempts to return to target, =0and IR —RJ
>(1/rn) (r —r)
Post—October 1979 Operatin& Procedures
Equations (10) and (12) give the response to the money announcement
of both short— and long—term interest rates under a federal funds rate operating—14—
procedure. On October 6, 1979, however, the Federal Reserve shifted to a
nonborrowed reserves operating procedure. Such a procedure involves setting
a path for rionborrowed reserves which is consistent with achieving the targeted
path for money. To analyze the interest rate response to a money announcement
during the post—October 1979 period it is necessary to note that the current
week's funds rate, is no longer fixed. A positive money surprise indicates
to market participants that the level of required reserves for the current
settlement week will be higher than expected. This should lead to a higher
funds rate in the remainder of the current week, which through the term
structure equation (5), leads to a higher r. To explicitly model this
additional effect, it is necessary to incorporate into the model a specification
of the market for reserves.
Under lagged reserve accounting, the log of required reserves is given
by
=k+ m2 (13)
where k is the log of the required reserve ratio. For simplicity, it is
assumed that all deposits are subject to the same reserve ratio and that the
deposit to money ratio is constant. Assuming excess reserves are zero,
equation (13) gives the demand for reserves.
The supply of reserves consists of nonborrowed reserves—taken to be
the policy variable in the post—October 1979 period—and borrowed reserves.
A rise in the funds rate relative to the discount rate leads to a rise in
bank borrowings and a fall in nonborrowed reserves as a fraction of total





where is the discount rate, and v is a mean zero, serially uncorrelated
disturbance term.
To represent the determination of the policy variable in week t, assume
lnNBR =lnNBR+
where lnNBR is the (log) value of nonborrowed reserves consistentwith
achieving the target path for the money supply and is a transitory policy
deviation from the target. Equation (7) replaces (7) in an analysisof the
post—October 1979 period. Parallel with the treatmentof the pre—October
1979 period, assume that at the beginning of week t, the public knows lnBR
but not its decomposition into lnNBR and
Under this operating procedure, the federal funds rate adjusts to
equilibrate the reserve market. Equating the demandfor reserves to the supply
and solving for i yields
= + [k ++ m2 —ln1BR+ v —]. (15)





A positive surprise (cr2 > 0) causes an upward revision in expected reserve
demand over the remainder of the settlement week, leading to arise in the
funds rate.
To determine the impact under a reserves operating procedureof the
announcement, equation (5) can be utilized, along with (16) toderive the







Oneresult is immediate from a comparison of (10), the pre—October 1979
effect, and (17), the post—October 1979 effect. For given values of a, p, A,
and 5, the change in operating procedures introduces a new term, l/n >0,
into the response coefficient. A given money surprise has a larger effect on
short—term interest rates under a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure
than under a funds rate operating procedure. This is consistent with the
increased response after October 1979 documented in Table 1. From (12) and
(17), however, it may be shown that the response of longer term (in—quarter)
yields increases by only 1/m .1/en.Thus, some other factors in the model must
contribute to the increased response of long—term yields.
One possibility is that the change in operating procedures was viewed
by the public as accompanied by a shift in the policy adjustment rule followed
by the Federal Reserve. If the use of noriborrowed reserves rather than the
funds rate was interpreted as signaling a greater determination on thepart
of the Federal Reserve to keep money on target, either A or (or both) may
have changed. A fall in would indicate that less of any deviation from
target would be accommodated, while a rise in A would indicate a faster elimina-
tion of any deviations. Either such change tends to increase the response to
the money surprise in (17) and (12).
Another result of the change in operating procedures was a large increase
in the volatility generally of interest rates. In Walsh (1982, 1983), it is—17—
shown that a rise in the volatility of interest rates may lead to a fall in
the interest elasticity of the demand for money which is proportional to the
rise in volatility. Such a decline inas a consequence of the shift to a
nonborrowed reserves operating procedure would also tend to increase the
response of both short— and long—term yields to a given money surprise.The
effects of changes in these various parameters are examined further using
numerical examples in the fourth section.
III. pected Inflation Model
The model in the previous section, in order to focus on the policy
anticipations effect, assumed that the expected rate of inflation remained
constant in the face of the money announcement. This implies that the interest
rate adjustments were adjustments in real interest rates. An alternative view
of interest rate determination argues that real interest rates are independent
of monetary influences so that any response of interest rates to a money
announcement must be due to changes in the expected inflation premium incorporated
in market rates. The present section develops a model of interest rate responses
which attributes all changes in rates to changes in expected inflation.
If p is the constant ex ante real rate of interest and rt is, as before,
the rate on an n—week security, then
r =p+[E(Pt+It)
— + (18)
16/ and n Is a mean zero disturbance term assumed to be serially
where y =5200— t
uncorrelated.
In the model of section II, any deviation of the money stock from its
target value leads to an adjustment in target levels but no changein the targeted
long—run growth rate. This assumption needs to be modified to allowfor the
possibility that a value of m_2 above target leads the Federal Reserve torevise—18—
upwardsits targeted growth rate. If this occurred, the public, in the face of
a positive money surprise, might infer faster money growth and higher inflation
in the future. This possibility can be captured by rewriting the policy




where use has been made of the fact that Pc_2 =E(m
—mi(ti).To
understand the role of 2' suppose that the targeted growth rate is k and that
=m2+ (j+2)k. The actual growth rate from t—2 to t—l is estimated,
at time t, to be k+ pc2. If this growth rate were to be maintained, the new
target for m+. would be =
E(m1Ic2) + (j+1)k + (j+l)pc2 (ignoring A
and for simplicity). If the deviation has no effect on the targeted growth
rate, m+. =E(mttt) + (j+1)k, which is the case considered in the previous
section. Equation (2) allows a fraction t52 of the growth—rate deviation to
have a permanent effect on the Federal Reserve's growth—rate target.
To determine the expected rate of inflation as a function of the under-
lying parameters of the model, it is first necessary to find the equilibrium
solution for the log of the price level. From the money demand equation (3)




—a[p+ (y/n)(E(pt+ — +u. (19)
Solving for p, equation (19) implies
=(n+yct)[n1n +n(aii —a0)+ yaE(p+ —nut]. (20)
Since ya/(n+ya) <1,equation (20) can be solved forward under the assumption
of rational expectations. This yields—19—
____ n
(T_)J E(inT Pt =aia +'(in —u)+ —
0n+yatt n+yc&
() E(uk). (21) —
n+ya n+ycz t+jnt
Inresponse to the Friday announcement, rt adjusts to the extentthat
(y/n) [E(pt+It) —r'1 isaffected. Using (21) to evaluate the change in
[E(p+) —pr),
the appendix shows that under the policy rule (2),
(i—A)(i—6 ) n+l a_ b[















— (1/rn)p(p_iL_ zp—--i t-2 •
n+ycx(l—p) 1=1J
Lettingin go to infinity, equation (23)impliesthat urn (Ra —R)
= m- t
anypermanent change in the annual growth rate of money leads to a one—f or—
one rise in long—term interest rates.
Because interest rates in this model adjust only in response tochanges
in the expected rate of Inflation, It Is possible to solve for the adjustment
responses in (22) and (23) without any reference to the Federal Reserve's
operating procedure. The expected Inflation model predicts that the interest—20--
rate response to a money announcement is independent of the particular proce-
dure used by the Federal Reserve to implement monetary policy. To explain
the large increases in the response coefficients reported in Table 1 within
the context of the inflation expectations model, it is necessary to assume
that there were shifts in the basic model parameters at the time of the change
in operating procedures. For example, a rise in 62 the fraction of the week
t—2 to t—l growth rate deviation which the Federal Reserve accommodates, would
increase the response coefficients. Using numerical examples, the model is
also compared to the estimated responses in the next section.
IV. Evaluation of the Models
In this section, the stylized models of the policy anticipations and
the expected inflation effects are examined in terms of their consistency
with the empirical results reported in Table 1. While the models are specified
under a variety of simplifying assumptions, they nevertheless embody the impor-
tant features of the underlying hypotheses. Following the evaluation of the
models, additional empirical evidence is presented on the persistence of
announced money surprises.
In examining the consistency of the models with the estimated responses
in Table 1, iterative grid searches are performed over the models' parameters
in both the pre— and post—October 1979 periods. In addition, the searches
are implemented simultaneously for the 3—month (n=13), 1—year (m=4), 5—year
(m=20), 10—year (m=40), and the 20—year (m=80) yields. For the policy
anticipations model, the response of the 3—month yield is represented by (10) and
(17) for the pre— and post—October 1979 periods, respectively. For longer
term yields (m=4, 20, 40, 80), the response under both policy regimes is—21—
given by (12). For the expected inflation model, the responseof the
3—month yield is represented by (22), and the response of longer term yields
is given by (23). In each case, all parameters of the models——A,,p,
and cS2 (when relevant)——are subjected to the grid search. The criterion
used in the search is to minimize the sum of the absolute percentage
differences from the point estimates in Table 1 across the fiveyields._Z'
Is the Policy Anticp!4ons Model Consistent with the Estimated Responses?
The response of the term structure of interest rates under the policy
anticipations hypothesis is computed for selected parameter values inTable 2.
The reported values for the responses consist of both those conforming to the
estimated responses in Table 1——given the criterion described above——as well
as examples exhibiting the effects of changes in parameter values. Asis
apparent in the table, sets of parameters are calculated separatelyfor the
pre— and post—October 1979 periods.
For the pre—October 1979 period, the policy anticipations model is
capable of yielding responses fairly close to those in Table 1 when the
parameters take values of p =.986,=.143,A.687, and =.000.
The response of the 3—month yield, for example, is calculated as 6.48,which
is identical to its estimated value in Table 1. Moreover, the responsesof
longer term interest rates are all positive and fairly close to the
corresponding estimated values.
The reported parameter values implied by the responses for the pre—
October 1979 period suggest that weekly money demand disturbances are highly
serially correlated (p =.986),and that they are eventually offset
completely (6, =0).The speed at which a money demand shock is offset,—22—
however, is implausibly high. In particular, the value in Table 2 (A =.687)
implies that approximately 68 percent (A pcr2) of a surprise in
announced money is offset during the week of the announcement. The responses
are nevertheless quite insensitive to changes in the rate at which surprises
are offset, as indicated by the third and fourth rows in Table 2. In contrast,
the fraction of the surprise accommodated has a larger impact on the responses,
as indicated in the second row, where is increased to .100.
In the lower panel of Table 2, sets of parameter values for the post—
October 1979 period are reported. The first row again corresponds to the
parameters obtained from the grid search. The next three rows report values
for selected changes in the policy parameters, as before. The results for
the post—October 1979 period suggest that money surprises are somewhatmore
highly serially correlated (p =.996),and that the interest—rate responsiveness
of money demand is over five times smaller than that in the pre—October 1979
period.--' Because of the persistence ofmoney demand shocks and the much
lower interest—rate responsiveness of money demand, short—term ratesmust
remain above their original levels for an extended period of time if the
original long—run target path for money is maintained (0).The combination
of these factors is sufficient to explain the relatively largeresponse of long—
term interest rates. By comparing the first and fifth rows in each panel,note
that changes in policy parameters across periods have negligible effects on
the responses.
Is the Expected Inflation Model Consistent with the Estimated Responses?
Analogous to Table 2, the response of the term structure of interest
rates under the expected inflation hypothesis is solved for selectedparameterTable 2
SELECTED PARAMETER VALUES FOR











R3M R1Y R5Y R1OY R2OY
6.48 5.19 1.96 1.006 .503
5.86 4.52 1.28 .318 —.185
5.98 5.07 1.94 .994 .497
6.84 5.28 1.98 1.015 .508
6.82 5.28 1.98 1.015 .508
6.48 5.20 2.57 .920 1.16
Interest Rate Rponse:Post—October1979 (p=.996, CL=.0265)t
tThe post—October 1979
one—week bill yield's
responses are calculated under the assumption that the
response equals its estimated value in Table 1 of
36.72. This estimate implies =.027.
From Table 1.
.779 .000 36.4 34.4 23.8 16.1 9.06
.779 .100 32.8 30.7 20.1 12.4 5.30
.679 .000 34.4 33.9 23.7 16.1 9.04













*See the notes in Table 1 for variabledefinitions.Parameters are defined
in the text.Table 3
SELECTED PARAMETERVALUES FOR
THEEXPECTED INFLATION MODEL*
Policy Interest Rate Response:
Parameters Pre—October 1979_(p_31,.0418)
A l_____ R3M RlY R5Y R1OY—R2OY
.438.006 .000192 6.47 5.20 1.82 1.38 115
.438.000 .000192 4.24 4.64 1.71 1.32 1.12
.438.106 .000192 43.7 14.5 3.68 2.31 1.62
.338.006 .000192 6.53 5.20 1.82 1.38 1.15
.538.006 .000192 6.47 5.20 1.82 1.38 1.15
.438.006 .000092 —2.14 2.69 .931 .688 .567
.438.006 .000292 15.1 7.72 2.71 2.06 1.74
.438.021 .00256 216 66.2 23.2 17.8 15.1
estimate 6.48 5.20 2.57 .920 1.16
Interest Rate Response:
Post—October 1979 (p=.980, cv.0216)
.438.021 .00256 36.4 32.3 19.1 16.1 14.6
.438.000 .00256 28.2 30.2 18.7 15.9 14.5
.438.121 .00256 75.6 42.1 21.1 17.1 15.1
.338.021 .00256 36.5 32.3 19.1 16.1 14.6
.538.021 .00256 36.4 32.3 19.1 16.1 14.6
.438.021. .00156 —13.1 16.1 11.8 9.89 8.92
.438.021 .00356 85.9 48.5 26.4 22.3 20.2
.438.006 .000192 —86.7 —7.51 L49 1.25 1011
estimatet 36.4 35.5 21,2 16.1 14.4
*See the notes in Table 1 for variable definitions. Parameters are defined
in the text.
1From Table 1.—23—
values in Table 3. As before, parameter values may be obtained which areconsis-
tent with the estimated responses in Table 1. In the pre—October1979 period,
the value for the serial correlation of money demand shocks is again quitehigh,
but the interest—rate responsiveness of money demand Is lowerthan that computed
under the policy anticipations hypothesis. The policy parameters alsodiffer
substantially. In particular, the rate at which money surprises areoffset
(X) is .438, although the reported responses are fairly insensitive tothis
parameter, as Indicated in the fourth and fifth rows inthe table. In addition,
the results suggest that a portion of the shock is accommodated by changingthe
level of money's target path (oi =.006),and that the Federal Reserve permanently
raises its target growth rate in response to a positive shock (62 =.000192).
For a positive 1 percent shock, for example, the target annualized growthrate is
increased by almost .01 percentage points (5262). As indicated in the table,
the 20—year yield's response of about 1 basis point predominatelyreflects this
revision in the target growth rate. This sensitivity is also apparentin the
sixth and seventh rows in the table, where the responses are calculatedwith
different values of 62. The response of short—term yields also depends
importantly on the initial accommodation in the currentlevel of money (6i),
as may be seen in the second and third rows.
For the post—October 1979 period, the two main changesin the parameters
are that 62 increases to .00256 and the interest—rate responsivenessof money
demand is about one—half its previous value. As suggested byCornell (1983)
and Hardouvelis (1982), the increase in 62 indicates greater accommodationof
money surprises by the Federal Reserve throughrevisions in its target growth
rate. In this case, the calculated value of 62 indicatesthat a 1 percent—24—
money surprise leads to a revision in the target annualized money growth of
.13 percentage points. Again, the 20—year yield's response of 14.6 basis
points predominately reflects this accommodation. The eighth row in each panel
also indicates the key role of this parameter.
Persistence of Money Surprises
The previous two subsections indicate that different sets of parameter
values may be found that make both the policy anticipations and expected infla-
tion hypotheses consistent with the estimated responses in Table 1. Despite
this inability to distinguish between the hypotheses on the basis of their
consistency with the estimated responses, the implications of the models do
differ dramatically. In particular, under the policy anticipations hypothesis,
the parameter values indicate that money surprises are totally offset after
some period of time. In contrast, under the expected inflation hypothesis,
target growth rates are permanently changed in the direction of the surprise.
These different implications suggest one way in which the hypotheses
may be distinguished. In particular, under the policy anticipations hypothesis,
past surprises in the announced level of money would be expected to have
diminishing effects on the level of the money stock over time. Under the
expected inflation hypothesis, this should not be the case. Indeed, for
money surprises to affect expected inflation over the maturity of a long—
term security, surprises would be expected to persist overlengthy intervals.
The monetary policy rule specified previously (2)may be used to
illustrate the possible relationship between pastmoney surprises and the
level of the money stock. In particular, recursive substitutionyields
=m(k)++ peel + z[(j+1)2÷+_1_6i)1t__2 (24)—25—
where = + + Under the pure policy anticipations model,
62 =0so that as j becomes large, the coefficients on the lagged money
surprises decline, approaching 61p asymptotically. In contrast, the infla-
tion expectations model requires 62 >0.In this case, equation (24) shows
that as j becomes larger, the coefficients on the lagged money surprises
must eventually start increasing with j. For the parameters reported in
Table 3 for the post—October 1979 period, for example (A =.438, =.021,
62 =.00256),the coefficients are increasing for j 10.
Equation (24), therefore, suggests a simple means of discriminating
between the policy anticipations hypothesis and the inflation expectations
hypothesis. To examine the persistence of money surprises, the following
empirical analogue of equation (24) is estimated:
m =b+ b •trend+ E c. (24)
t 0 1 tjJt—J
wherethe trend variable is used to proxy If 62 >0,the c.'s
should eventually increase with j; if 620, they should decline towards a
possibly nonzero constant. The estimation results for equation (24')for
both the pre— and post—October 1979 periods are reported in Table 4. In
each case, the equation is estimated without any constraints on the lag
20 / structure.—
The estimation results suggest that money surprises are offset within
one year. In both periods, additional lag terms were included in the equations
until the estimated coefficients appeared to remain around, or even below,
zero.—' In the pre—October 1979 period, the unconstrained estimates become
negative after 33 weeks. Similarly, estimated lag coefficients for the post—
October 1979 period become negative after 48 weeks. This empirical evidence,
at least, casts strong doubt on the validity of the expected inflation hypothesis.Table 4
PER.SISTECEOF )IONEY SURPRISES
ln}l —bO+bitTefld2 ci +et i -
Pre—Octoher1979 Post—October 1Q79
bO 5.828* (.0026) 6.425* (.0880)
bI .0011* (.0001) ..029* (.0040)
cO .9295* (.1971) 5443* (.0688)
ci .5852* (.1996) .6480* (.0693)
.4850* (.2031) .636* (.0695)
c3 .3853 (.2014) .5532* (.0/05)
c4 )7.7* (.180)) .4759* (.0710)
c5 .1681 (.1699) ._312* (.0698)
cb .2002 (.1705) .5236* (.0680)
.2418 (.1719) 4739* (.0690)
CS .2617 (.1707) .5310* (.0.'87)
c9 .1362 (.]b53) •49* (.0655)
dO .1902 (.1654) .4512* (.071])
cii .2051 (.1622) .5121* (.0737)
c12 .1784 (.1611) 4453* (.0747)
c13 .3011 (.1610) .6404* (.0725)
c14 .2804 (.1594) .6337* (.0753)
cIS .2819 (.1600) .5663* (.0754)
c16 .3998* (.1649) .4610* (.0797)
c17 .4098* (.3622) .4692* (.0768)
c18 .4193* (.1609) .4846* (.0787)
c19 .3889* (.1609) .4126* (.0770)
c20 •4344* (.1626) .4500* (.0782)
c21 •4143* (.1621) .4084* (.0780)
c2 .4265* (.1586) .5655* (.0781)
c23 .3270 (.1690) .4868* (.0786)
c24 .2866 (.1736) .4136* (.0777)
c25 .4550* (.1746) .3803* (.0786)
c26 .3647* (.1764) .5154* (.0767)
c27 .3965* (.1797) .4305* (.0770)
c2$ .3S90 (.1767) .2646* (.0796)
c29 .3869* (.1846) .3278* (.0779)
c30 .2728 (.1825) .2595* (.0794)
c31 .1401 (.1903) .2673* (.0776)
c37 .1400 (.1912) .1623* (.0763)
c33 .0406 (.1980) .1157 (.0634)
c34 —.1059 (.1916) .1896* (.0634)


















*cnerf$cjcntis morethan twice its estimated standard error.
5etthe n'tec inTable 1. Due to the lag Jeniths. the estimation
r'ersbegin 36an 53 weeksrespertive3v afterthc.start1n dates
ef the arp1c periods reportedin Table1. These reduced estication
p. nods c'nsistof 68 and 111observations in thpie— andpost—
( tober1979 periods,respectively. The lags are estimated uncc'nstrained.
trnd • t * •+ a2 t - a3 t' wherc t — 1.2.3..... and th
d.ireec't th pn1ni'etil in eath period i di'tcrmtnodby tIu' statistical ir ni !icanrothe I 1..;.),•rm. In h. nbr.rFy79 pvrind.a a3 • 0. Also note that —
t—1—26—
V. Summary of Conclusions
By constructing a model of interest rate responses to money announcements,
it has been possible to examine explicitly the effect of the Federal Reserve's
operating procedures and policy rule on the responses across the entire term
structure of interest rates. Two main conclusions follow from this paper.
First, despite claims to the contrary, the policy anticipations hypothesis
is capable of explaining the response of the entire term structure of interest
rates to surprises in weekly money announcements. This hypothesis wasshown
to be consistent with the response in both the pre— and post—October 1979
periods. Two key elements of this explanation involve the persistenceof
money demand shocks along with the FederalReserve's desire to eventually
offset money surprises. Nevertheless, the expected inflation hypothesis was
also shown to be consistent with the term structure's response. Under this
hypothesis, it follows that the Federal Reserve increases both thelevel and
growth rate of their monetary target in response to positive money surprises.
Second, in examining the effects of past money surprises on the levelof
the money stock, the empirical evidence suggested that their effects diminish
to zero within one year. This result is inconsistent with the expectedinfla-
tion hypothesis, which posits an increasing effect of money surprises on the
level of the money stock. Further empirical work would, nevertheless, be
useful in distinguishing between the competing hypotheses.Footnotes
*The authors are associate professor of finance, University of Wash-
ington, and assistant professor of economics, Princeton University,
respectively. They are grateful to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
for research support, to Rick Troll for research assistance, and to Gikas
Hardouvelis, Laurence Kantor, Ryamond Lombra, Douglas Pearce, Howard Roth,
David Small, Paul Wachtel, and Charles Webster for helpful comments. This
paper is a part of the Financial Markets and Monetary Economics Program of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. InitIal research on thistopic also includes unpublished studiesby Sivesarid (1978) and Conrad (1978).
2. Both of these studiesare, of course, based on pre—October 1979 data.
Using post—October 1979 data, Makin (1982) findsthat movements in nominal interest rates have been influencedmore by changes in expected real rates
than by expected inflation.
3. However, Cornell (1982) doesnot attribute these results to thepolicy anticipations effect. Also, Urich and Wachtel(1982) and Roley and Troll (1983) exanine the impact of
unanticipated announced changes in the con-
sumer (CPI) and producer (FF1) price indiceson Treasury bill yields. Both
studies find statistically Insignificantresponses in the pre—October 1979
period, and Urich and Wachtel (1982) estimatea response to FF1 surprises
which is significant at the 5percent level in the October i979—June 1981
period. By extending the sample to October1982, however, Roley and Troll (1983) fincf That the estimated
response is again insignificant at the 10 percent level.
4. The excluded observationscorrespond to announcements of the CPI, the
FF1, the unemployment rate, and industrialproduction. In the pre—October
1979 sample, 43 observations wereexcluded, while 22 were excluded in the
post—October 1979 sample.
5. Announced changes in Mi—B areanalyzed here because of the emphasis
placed on Mi—B by Federal Reserve polIcyrnakersand market participants. It
should also be noted that the Mi—B data for1981 are not the shift—adjusted
MI—B figures which reflect the introductionof nationwide NOW accounts.
While the Federal Reserve'starget range was in terms of shift—adjusted Mi—B,
weekly announced changes were not shift adjusted.
6. As reported by Roley (1983) in thecontext of the response of Treasury
bill yields, specifying thesurprise in terms of levels rather than changes
has virtually no effect on theempirical results. For this paper, specifi-
cations were estimated with changes in thelevels of interest rates,
changes in the log of interest rates, and withmoney surprises in terms of
announced changes, announced levels, and thelog of announced levels.
Again these alternative specificationsyielded virtually the same results.
We are Indebted to Raul A. Nicho, vicepresident with Money Market Services,
for making the survey data available forthis project.7. In forming the revised expectation, the change in the 3—month bill yield
from Tuesday at 3:30 p.m. to Friday at 3:30 p.m. is taken as a proxy for the
receipt of all new information from the time of the survey to justbefore
the money announcement. Regressing the announced change in money on the
survey measure and this change in the bill yieldindicates that this proxy
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level [see Roley (1983)].The
rationality of the survey data is examined by Grossman (1981) for the pre—
October 1979 period and by Roley (1983) for the post—October 1979 period.
These studies indicate that except for an additive bias in the pre—October
1979 period, usual hypotheses concerning the rationality of the expected
money data used here cannot be rejected at low significancelevels. For
further analysis of these data, see Urich and Wachtel (1983).
8.In contrast to the other yield data used here,eral funds rate data
provided by the Federal Reserve are in terms of daily averages. These data,
however, predominately reflect federal funds trading before 3:30 p.m.
9. Following Urich and Wachtel (1981) and Roley (1983), more complicated
specifications which disaggregated money surprises according tothe rela-
tionship of money growth to its long—run policy ranges were alsoestimated.
However, because of the larger standard errors of the equationsestimated
here due to the longer time interval over which the changes in rates were
measured, the effects of policy ranges were not statistically significant
for any of the yields in the post—October 1979 period. In the pre—October
1979 period, however, the effects of policy ranges were statistically
significant in two instances, but only because of statisticallysignificant
coefficients with perverse signs. Also, the presence of statistically
significant constant terms in some of the estimated equationsin Table 1
may reflect measurement error in eitherthe expected money data or the
change in interest rates. Alternatively, they may reflect day—of—the—week
effects [Gibbons and Hess (1981)).
10. To avoid potential problems associated with heteroscedasticitY,the
equations in each of the periods are weighted by the reciprocalsof their
estimated standard errors in the tests.
11. The role of the announcement in providing information on past money
demand shifts is emphasized by Urich (1982) and Nichols, Small, and lebster
(1983).
12. Equation (2) is similar to the policy rule used by Tinsley, von zur
l'Iuehlen, and Fries (1982), although they assume =0.
13. McCallum and Hoehn (1983) analyze the optimal instrument choicein the
context of lagged reserve accounting. For empirical evidence,see Sivesand
and Hurley (1980).
14. In a similar specification of a biweekly money demand equation, Urich
(1982) assumes u is serially uncorrelated.15. Equation (10) can be compared with the results of other authors. Urich
(1982) assumes ct2 provides no information on and that 6-j0.His
expression for the announcement effect corresponds, therefore, only to the
first term in (10). Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983) rely on an expected
interest rate change in the money demand equation to motivate future expec-
tations affecting current interest rates. They also assume m is the policy
instrument of the Federal Reserve and that ni2 —E(m reveals informa-
tion on the net shock to both money supply and money emand during week
t—2. However, under lagged reserve accounting, the major shocks generating
week—to—week fluctuations in the money stock arise from the demand for money
as modeled here.
16. In the empirical work, interest rates are measured in basis points at
annual rates. This makes it necessary to multiply an n—week rate of change
such as t+n —Ptby 5200.
17. For computational convenience, certain limitations were placed on the
number of digits taken by the parameters. In particular, A, ,andp were
restricted to three decimal points, and three nonzero digits were found for
and 62. All parameters were restricted to take values between zero and
one.
18. The increased interest—rate volatility in the post—October 1979 period
coinciding with the change in operating procedures is capable of explaining
this fall in interest elasticity in the model presented by Walsh (1982,
1983). In addition, this elasticity may have declined due to increased
financial innovation and deregulation, which may not be totally independent
of the rise in volatility. See, for example, Lindsey (1977) and Niehans (1982).
19. Note that a proxy for is not needed in (24') since the money
surprises t—j—2 (j=0,...,k—1) are, under rational expectations, uncorrelated
with this variable. The proxy was instead included to reduce heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. In this model, as is common in many rational expecta-
tions models, standard serial correlation correction procedures would result
in inconsistent coefficient estimates. In contrast, OLS estimation yields
consistent coefficient estimates in this case, but potentially inconsistent
estimated standard errors.
20. Polynomial lags were also estimated, and they yielded virtually the same
qualitative results.
21. Extending both lags beyond the lengths reported in Table 4 suggested that
the estimated coefficients do not once again increase. Furthermore, lagged
money surprises were entered separately on the right—hand side of (24 )(i.e.,
c1 =0(ij), c 0) and the estimation results were comparable to those
reported in the table.References
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This appendix contains a more detailed derivation of the results
reported in sections II and III.
Policy Anticipations Model
From the term structure relationship equation (5),
=(l/n)i+ (1/n) E E(i+.J) (A.1)
since, from (7), E(i+.lt) =E(i+).Using the fact that (l/n)ZE(i÷1k) =
— (1/n)E(i+I), equation (A.l) can be manipulated to
eliminate the future federal funds rates, yielding
rt =(l/n)i+j!O E(r÷+i '÷+'+ ((n_l)/n)E(rI) (A.2)
where it is assumed that E(+c,jt) =E(r÷1).The target values of r÷.
are found by using the money demand equation (3):
=ci'cx
—1+i()÷cLE(u÷lc2);i=O,... (A.3)







+ ((n—l)/n) E(rj'). (A.4)










a) -E(mTb)} (A.5) +— 1
Toevaluate each of these terms, note that equation (2) implies, since
brand— t t—lt t'
E(m.÷1I) -E(m÷. ) =(+ (l—A)2(i—1))t-2 pc (A.6)
Also, from (4),
jn+3 jn+4 jn+3 —E(u++iI)
= — '— = (A.7)
Using (A.6) and (A.7), equation (A.5) becomes
b r -r=a1{[6i + (i-A)i2(la)] -[+ (lX)3n+l(1)I} tt
j =0
+-' [Jn-f-3—in+n+2j n—i —
2
— cx — n lt—2 j =0
-
[p(l-A)2(i-1)
[(i-A)' - 1] n—i-(n-l)1 = +----p ______ a1 _____
I—Cl—A) 1—p
whichis equation (10).
Toderivethe response for longer term interest rates, equation (11)
implies
rn-i
—Rb=(l/m)(ra—r)+ (1/rn)E [E(r kflk)—E(r+j)] (A.8) tt
k=1
Using(A.3), since E(r+kl) =E(r+k!),
rn-i
R —R
=(i/m)(r—r)+ (i/rn)E [—a[E(m÷kI) —
k=1E(mk)] +cr'[E(u+kI) —E(ut+kkfl.
(A.9)





This is equation (12).
For the post—October 1979 operating procedures, idoesnot necessarily
remainconstant in response to the announcement. From (A.4), this implies
that a term, (1/n) [E(il) —E(ik)}





adding(1/n)'c_2 to the response coefficient found in (10) yields (17).
ExpectedInflation Model




Thesolution equation for p, given by (21),implies that
= — + (m —




Taking expectations of both sides of (A.l2) yields
E(p+I) = — O+n+yj=l
—nycz,E] n'-c?
(A.13)From (A.ll) and (A.13) it follows that





( ) [E(u a) —E(uJ t+jn t+jn (A.14)





Using (A.15) and (A.7), equation (A.14) can be written as






To find the response of long—term interest rates, start with equation













p(p—l —(1/rn) E p
n+yc(l_pt5i=lj
t—2